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BREACH OF MEDICAL CONFIDENCE IN OHIO
by
CRAIG E. JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION
In Ohio, the principle of confidentiality embodied in the Hippocratic Oath
is more than an ethical principle espoused by the medical profession.' For
physicians licensed to practice within this state, by virtue of Section 4731.22 of
the Ohio Revised Code, the principle is a legal obligation, the breach of which
may subject the practitioner to disciplinary action up to and including revoca-
tion of his medical license. Unfortunately, the Ohio Revised Code's section on
physician licensing is no more specific than the Hippocratic Oath in defining
what "ought" not be disclosed. Furthermore, the medical licensing section ap-
plies only to a small fraction of those who have access to medical secrets. A
multitude of social workers, health care professionals, insurance industry per-
sonnel and others have access to patient information equally capable of
stigmatizing a patient for life.'
Fortunately, the patchwork of state and federal statutory, administrative,
and case law has greatly limited unrestricted disclosure of medical secrets
through the threat of civil and criminal liability. While the law governing the
disclosure of medical information sorely lacks a comprehensive approach, one
overriding principle emerges from this patchwork: the concern for confiden-
tiality represented in the Hippocratic Oath is alive in Ohio and should guide
the release of any medical secrets in the state. There are several statutes that
regulate the release of certain types of medical information. For example, in-
formation concerning patients suffering from alcohol or drug abuse is covered
*The author is the Associate Director of Contracts Administration at The Ohio State University. B.A.. Sum-
ma Cum Laude, University of Maryland (1980); J.D., with honors, The Ohio State University (1983).
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Thomas E. Berry. Christine M. Kinworthy and
Claudette M. Spanel for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
"'Whatever in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with it. I see or hear in the life
of man, which ought not be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, thinking that all such should be kept secret."
The Hippocratic Oath. See generally, AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1943).
2That section provides in relevant part that "[Tlhe (state medical) board... shall, to the extent permitted by
law, limit, reprimand, revoke, suspend, place on probation, refuse to register, or reinstate a certificate (to
practice medicine or surgery, or osteopathic medicine or surgery.) for ... (4) Willfully betraying a profes-
sional secret." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (Baldwin 1984).
'See, e.g., Comment, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REv. 265 (1981).
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by Sections 5234 and 5275 of the Public Health Services Act, and the com-
prehensive regulatory scheme thereunder,6 and information concerning mental
illness may be subject to the restrictions of Section 5122.31 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code.7 The burden of regulating the disclosure of most types of medical
'This section provides as follows:
(a) Disclosure authorization:
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in
connection with the performance of any program or activity relating to alcoholism or alcohol
abuse education, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted, regulated, or
directly or indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the United States shall, except as
provided in subsection (e) of this section, be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes
and under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Purpose and circumstances of disclosure affecting consenting patient and patient regardless of
consent:
(1) The content of any record referred to in subsection (a) of this section may be disclosed in ac-
cordance with the prior written consent of the patient with respect to whom such record is
maintained, but only to such extent, under such circumstances, and for such purposes as may
be allowed under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (g) of this section.
(2) Whether or not the patient, with respect to whom any given record referred to in subsection
(a) of this section is maintained, gives his written consent, the context of such record may be
disclosed as follows:
(A) To medical personnel to the extent necessary to meet a bona fide medical emergency.
(B) To qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific research, management
audits, financial audits, or program evaluation, but such personnel may not identify,
directly or indirectly, any individual patient in any report of such research, audit, or
evaluation, or otherwise disclose patient identities in any manner.
(C) If authorized by an appropriate order of a court of competent jurisdiction granted after
application showing good cause therefor. In assessing good cause the court shall weigh
the public interest and the need for disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the phy-
sician-patient relationship, and to the treatment services. Upon the granting of such or-
der. the court, in determining the extent to which any disclosure of all or any part of any
record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.
(c) Prohibition against use of record in making criminal charges or investigation of patient:
Except as authorized by a court order granted under subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, no record
referred to in subsection (a) of this section. no record referred to in subsection (a) of this section
may be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any in-
vestigation of a patient.
(d) Continuing prohibition against disclosure irrespective of status of a patient:
The prohibitions of this section continue to apply to records concerning any individual who has
been a patient, irrespective of whether or when he ceases to be a patient.
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (1983).
142 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1984). This section provides limitations on the disclosure of drug abuse information
identical to those provided for disclosure of alcohol abuse information under Section 523 of the Act. See in-
fra note 4 for the full text of Section 523.
642C.F.R. §§ 2.11, 2.12 (1984).
'Section 5122.31 reads as follows:
All certificates, applications, records, and reports made for the purpose of Chapter 5122 of the Re-
vised Code, other than court journal entries or court docket entries, and directly or indirectly identify-
ing a patient or former patient or person whose hospitalization has been sought under Chapter 5122
of the Revised Code shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person except:
(A) If the person identified, or his legal guardian, if any, or if he is a minor, his parent or legal guard-
ian, consents, and if such disclosure is in the best interests of the person, as may be determined by
the court for judicial records and by the head of the hospital for hospital records;
(B) When disclosure is provided for in this chapter or section 5123.60 of the Revised Code (provides
for legal counsel to represent individuals hospitalized for mental illness);
(C) That hospitals may release necessary medical information to insurers to obtain payment for
goods and services furnished to the patient;
(D) Pursuant to a court order signed by a judge;
(E) That a patient shall be granted access to his own psychiatric and medical records, unless access is
specifically restricted in a patient's treatment plan for clear treatment reasons;
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:3
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information, however, has fallen upon the common law. The common law also
acts to close the gaps in statutory schemes seeking to limit the disclosure of a
particular type of medical information. This article deals with the development
of the common law in this area and the emergence of breach of confidence as a
recognized tort in Ohio.
ELEMENTS OF TORTIous BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
As previously noted, aside from the physician licensing statute, which
subjects a physician to possible disciplinary action for "willfully betraying a
professional secret," there is no comprehensive statutory prohibition in Ohio
governing the disclosure of medical information. Even the physician licensing
statute is of little assistance for one attempting to develop a comprehensive
policy on the release of medical information because of the vagueness of its
prohibition. There is, however, case law that provides that the unauthorized
disclosure of such information may result in civil liability. It also provides a
fair amount of guidance to those holding such information as to when and how
information may be released. While civil liability is potentially present where
medical information is released in violation of a statutory prohibition, such as
in the case of records pertaining to treatment of mental illness, in such situa-
tions civil liability merely provides an additional incentive to abide by statutes
and administrative regulations. In such situations, civil liability cases are in-
structive when the regulatory or statutory scheme fails to address a particular
issue relating to disclosure.
Several reported cases have imposed civil liability on physicians and
others for the unauthorized release of information obtained about a patient
during the course of treatment. These cases have relied on a number of legal
theories as the basis for such liability, including breach of contract, breach of
trust, invasion of privacy and defamation. Common among all of these cases,
however, is the struggle of the courts to fit a breach of confidence within the
parameters of a recognized cause of action.
In 1977, the Supreme Court of New York relied on the contractual theory
of liability when it was confronted with the issue of unauthorized disclosure of
confidential psychological information in a case styled Doe v. Roe.8 In this
case, a psychiatrist and her husband, a psychologist, published a popular book
(F) That hospitals and other institutions and facilities within the department of mental health may
release psychiatric medical records and interchange other pertinent medical information with
other hospitals, institutions and facilities with which the department has a current agreement for
patient care or services. The department of mental health shall adopt rules to implement this divi-
sion.
The department of mental health shall adopt rules with respect to the procedures for the destruction
of patient records. No person shall reveal the contents of a psychiatric medical record of a patient ex-
cept as authorized by law.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31 (Baldwin 1984).
193 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
Winter, 19861
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containing verbatim disclosures by the plaintiff, a former patient of the defen-
dant psychiatrist, involving the plaintiffs most intimate thoughts. Even
though her name was not expressly given in the book, the material included
sufficient biographical material for some of the plaintiff's friends and col-
leagues to identify her. The court found both the psychiatrist and her husband
liable for breach of contract, stating:
ITIhe liability of Dr. Roe to respond in damages is clear; and Mr. Poe's lia-
bility is equally clear. True, he and the plaintiff were not involved in a
physician-patient relationship and he certainly had no contractual rela-
tionship to her. But the conclusion is unassailable that Poe, like anyone
else with access to the book, knew that its source was the patient's produc-
tion in psychoanalysis.... If anyone was the actor in seeing to it that the
work was written, that it was manufactured, advertised and circulated, it
was Poe. He is a co-author of the book and a willing, indeed avid, co-vio-
lator of the patient's rights and is therefore equally liable (citation
omitted) .'
Doe v. Roe is an excellent example of how the courts are struggling to
provide an adequate remedy for unauthorized releases of confidential informa-
tion. The courts frequently rely on traditional theories to find liability even
though such theories are inadequate to support the liability imposed. In Doe v.
Roe, the court relied upon the theory of breach of contract even though the
court recognized that the traditional approach to the theory was insufficient to
impose liability upon the defendant psychologist, who never actually had a
contractual relationship with the plaintiff and against whom there was no evi-
dence suggesting responsibility for inducing a breach of contract by the defen-
dant psychiatrist, who did have a contractual relationship with the plaintiff. 0
A number of cases have relied upon the traditional theory of invasion of
privacy to impose liability for the unauthorized release of information by
physicians and other allied medical professionals. The tort of invasion of
privacy encompasses four separate theories of liability: (1) appropriation of a
name or likeness, (2) intrusion of physical solicitude or seclusion, (3) public
disclosure of private facts, and (4) creating a false light in the public eye. The
first reported case to impose liability on a physician for invasion of privacy was
De May v. Roberts," decided by a Michigan court in 1881. In the De May
case, a physician was held liable for permitting a layman to observe the birth of
the plaintiff's child. Since the tort of invasion of privacy had yet to evolve, the
De May court did not expressly hold that the plaintiff had a right to physical
solicitude, but in retrospect, it is clear that the De May case falls most neatly
1d. at 215, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
"See generally Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982). See also
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
"46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
[Vol. 19:3
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into this category. Most recent cases involving the release of medical secrets
fall within the scope of the "public disclosure of private facts" theory of liabili-
ty. 2 While the "public disclosure of private facts" theory generally involves
wide dissemination of the facts revealed, many courts have held that only
limited disclosure is required where, as in the case of the physician-patient rela-
tionship, there is a breach of a confidential relationship. 3 Thus, in both
Simonsen v. Swenson,"' a case decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
1920, and in Clark v. Geraci, 5 a New York case decided in 1960, liability was
imposed upon a physician notwithstanding the lack of widespread publicity of
the medical secrets disclosed.
While a number of American cases have relied upon the "public
disclosure of private facts" theory of liability without the element of wide
dissemination of the confidential information to impose liability on a physician
for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information, no reported American
case has expressly relied upon the English tort of breach of confidence as the
basis for imposing liability under such circumstances. This is an important
point since the English theory of breach of confidence differs significantly
from the invasion of privacy theory. The breach of confidence theory not only
permits recovery in the case of limited dissemination, it also permits a plaintiff
to recover where the publication was not intentional.
Several cases, however, have implicitly recognized breach of confidence
as a tort in its own right. An excellent example of such a decision is the New
York case styled MacDonald v. Clinger. ' 6 In MacDonald, a patient brought
suit against his psychiatrist for disclosing confidential information to his wife.
The traditional approach to the tort of public disclosure of private facts was ob-
viously an insufficient theory of liability due to the lack of publicity. The court
seemed to imply a tort based upon breach of confidence when it stated, "We
believe that the relationship contemplates an additional duty springing from
but extraneous to the contract and the breach of such duty is actionable as a
tort.""7 Similarly, in Berry v. Moench, '8 a Utah case, the court relied heavily on
the law of defamation in considering the potential liability of the defendant
physician, who advised the plaintiffs fiancee "to run as fast and as far as she
possibly could in any direction away from him," but the court seemed to en-
dorse a breach of confidence approach when it stated:
(I)t is obligatory upon the doctor not to reveal information obtained in
"See, e.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Banks v. King Features Syn-
dicate. Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"See PROSSER. TORTS 810 (4th ed. 1971).
14104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
"129 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
1684 A.D.2d 482. 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 1982).
"Id. at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
118 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
Winter, 19861
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confidence in connection with the diagnosis or the treatment of his pa-
tient. It is our opinion that if the doctor violates that confidence and
publishes derogatory matter concerning his patient, an action would lie
for any injury suffered. 9
The first Ohio case to expressly hold that the unauthorized release of
medical information is actionable was Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 10
a federal case applying Ohio law. The Hammonds case is the leading opinion in
the area of unauthorized disclosures of medical information. This is due in no
small part to the number of legal theories that the court embraced for imposing
liability for a physician's breach of confidence,2" including breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty.
Federal jurisdiction in the Hammonds case was based on diversity of
citizenship. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant insurance com-
pany for inducing the plaintiffs physician to release medical information
which the physician had obtained from the plaintiff in the course of treatment.
The plaintiff was injured while under the physician's care when a hospital bed
collapsed. The defendant insurer obtained medical information about the
plaintiff from the physician for use in a negligence suit brought by the plaintiff
against the hospital. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer induced the physi-
cian to release the information by falsely representing that the plaintiff had ad-
ditionally threatened a malpractice suit against the physician. The Hammonds
court held that, in Ohio, the physician-patient relationship is one founded in
simple contract and, as an implied term of the contract, the physician warrants
that any confidential information gained through the relationship will not be
released without the patient's consent.2 The court stated:
Any time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, .. . (d)octor and
patient enter into a simple contract, the patient hoping he will be cured
and the doctor optimistically assuming that he will be compensated. As an
implied condition of that contract, this Court is of the opinion that the
doctor warrants that any confidential information gained through the re-
lationship will not be released without the patient's permission. Almost
every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion con-
tained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon
this warranty of silence .... Consequently, when a doctor breaches his du-
91d. at 196, 331 P.2d at 817. The theory of breach of confidence is well established in England. See also
Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960). For an excellent discussion of the
English tradition and the emergence of the tort in the United States, see Note, Breach of Confidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
20243 F.Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
2 Nearly every recent case involving the issue of unauthorized disclosure of medical records has heavily
relied on the decision in Hammonds. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct.
1977); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah
2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
22Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801.
[Vol. 19:3
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ty of secrecy, he is in violation of part of his obligations under the con-
tract.23
The court, therefore, went beyond treating confidentiality simply as an
implied term of the physician-patient relationship and held that the physician
has a fiduciary duty of secrecy with respect to the confidences of his patient.
Consequently, any information obtained in the course of treating a patient is
held by the physician in trust, and the public policy of the state of Ohio re-
quires that the physician's breach of this trust be actionable in tort. In finding
the physician-patient relationship to be fiduciary in nature, the court stated:
The defendant here has also challenged, in its Motion for Reconsidera-
tion, the Court's finding that one who induces a physician's treachery
may also be held liable for damages. This finding was predicated upon the
holding that the physician-patient relationship is a confidential one which
imposes fiduciary obligations upon the physician .... As a consequence,
all reported cases dealing with this point hold that the relationship of the
physician and patient is a fiduciary one.... (I)t is readily apparent that the
legal obligations of a trustee are imposed upon any person operating in a
fiduciary capacity and the same principles of law governing the behavior
of a trustee are applicable to all fiduciaries."
The Hammonds court concluded, then, that "the preservation of the pa-
tient's privacy is no mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a le-
gal duty as well," 25 requiring that the unauthorized revelation of medical se-
crets, or any confidential communication given in the course of treatment, be
held to be "tortious conduct which may be the basis for an action in
damages."26
In determining what the public policy of Ohio is with respect to the con-
fidentiality of information transmitted between a patient and his physician, the
court relied on the promulgated code of ethic adopted by the medical profes-
sion" upon which the court held the public has a right to rely; the privileged
communications and acts statute,28 which precludes the doctor from testifying
in open court; and the state medical licensing statute,29 which seals the doctor's
2
3 Id.
2 Id. at 802-03.
2 5Id.
2 1d. at 801-02.
""The confidences (of the patient) should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when im-
peratively required by the laws of the state." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS Ch.
11, § 1 (1943).
2 That statute provides in relevant part that: "The following persons shall not testify in certain respects ...
(B) A physician concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relationship or his advice to
his patient." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1984).
19That statute provides in relevant part that: "(B) The (state medical) board shall, to the extent permitted by
law, limit, reprimand, revoke, suspend, place on probation, refuse to register, or reinstate a certificate (to
practice medicine or surgery, or osteopathic medicine or surgery,) for ... (4) Willfully betraying a profes-
sional secret." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22 (Baldwin 1984).
Winter, 19861
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lips in private conversation.3" Quoting the Supreme Court of Washington,3 the
Hammonds court stated:
Neither is it necessary to pursue at length the inquiry of whether a cause
of action lies in favor of a patient against a physician for wrongfully di-
vulging confidential communications. For purposes of what we have to
say it will be presumed that, for so palpable a wrong, the law provides a
remedy. 2
The court also held that the same principles governing trustees apply to
the physician's fiduciary duty of secrecy and to the liability of third parties par-
ticipating in or inducing a breach of the physician's duty."
Since the Hammonds case was decided by a federal court applying state
law, the decision is not binding precedent on the state courts of Ohio.
However, two state courts of Ohio have adopted the Hammonds decision in
reported cases and it is reasonable to assume that the sound opinion of the
court in Hammonds will be followed when other Ohio courts are confronted
with unauthorized disclosures of medical information. Not only does prece-
dent from other jurisdictions favor the Hammonds result, ' the growing con-
cern over the privacy of medical information has led to considerable legislative
activity limiting release of medical information by physicians and health care
facilities." Further, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Ohio courts will
treat physician and health care facility releases of information in substantially
the same manner since the same concerns are present.36 The validity of these
assumptions is reinforced by the decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Jackson," wherein the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, albeit in dic-
ta, endorsed the holding in Hammonds that a physician may be held liable in
'Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797.
3See Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 442, 162 P. 572, 573 (1917).
"Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801.
"3The court stated that:
(T)he same principles of law governing the third party participation in breaches of trust must also ap-
ply to one who participates in or induces the breach of any fiduciary duty. The law is settled in Ohio
and elsewhere that a third party who induces a breach of a trustee's duty of loyalty, or participates in
such a breach, or knowingly accepts the benefit from such a breach, becomes directly liable to the ag-
grieved party. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 803.
'See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 8-1I.
35See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.31, 5123.89 (Baldwin 1984).
36See, e.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). Liability was imposed on
hospital for release of photograph of nude baby with open heart. The theory of liability was that of invasion
of privacy for wrongful appropriation of the deceased infant's likeness. Unlike most of the cases discussed in-
volving unauthorized disclosures by physicians, Bazemore involved the element of wide dissemination
which is required in the more traditional theory of tortious invasion of privacy. However, a number of
reported cases have also imposed liability on banks for unauthorized disclosure of financial information with
only limited dissemination. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 83 Idaho 578, 367
P.2d 284 (1961); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
T110 Ohio App. 2d 137, 226 N.E.2d 760 (1967).
(Vol. 19:3
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damages for any unauthorized disclosure of medical information,38 and by the
decision in Prince v. St. Francis-St George Hospital, Inc.,39 in which the Court
of Appeals for Hamilton County not only applied the invasion of privacy
theory to a physician's breach of confidence, but also expanded the doctrine to
include negligent as well as intentional disclosures of confidential information.
In Prince, appellant Blanche Prince was treated as an inpatient in the care
unit of St. Francis-St. George Hospital, in Hamilton County, Ohio, for an
alcohol-related illness. She and her husband Russell Prince alleged that the
hospital gave them written guarantees of privacy concerning her treatment.
Mrs. Prince further alleged that, while in the hospital, she was treated by Doc-
tors Neumann and Scharold as agents or employees of the hospital or agents or
employees of Comprehensive Care Corporation, which had a contract with the
hospital to operate the care unit in which Mrs. Prince was a patient. ° Mr. and
Mrs. Prince further alleged that, while Mrs. Prince was in the care unit of the
hospital, a fellow employee of Mr. Prince received an insurance payment re-
quest sent by Dr. Scharold. The employee was not authorized to receive in-
surance payment request forms on behalf of his employer. Included on the
claim form ostensibly sent by Dr. Scharold was the diagnosis of "Acute &
Chronic Alcoholism Detoxification."4' The Princes' claimed that the publica-
tion of Mrs. Prince's chronic alcoholism, contrary to their express instructions,
resulted in Mrs. Prince suffering extreme mental and emotional stress and
medical expenses, and in Mr. Prince suffering extreme mental and emotional
stress and lost employment opportunities. 2
The defendants were granted summary judgment by the trial court and
the Princes appealed. The appellate court held that the assignment of error did
not avail as to the hospital because both defendant doctors were private physi-
cians who were not employees of the hospital and that, whatever tortious ac-
tion was attributable to the two doctors, or their employer, Comprehensive
Care Corporation, did not extend to the hospital.43 As to the two treating
physicians and their employer, however, the court found the appellants' assign-
ment of error well taken."
The court rejected the argument advanced by counsel for the two physi-
cians that appellants' cause of action must fail since there was no proof that
the disclosure, if any, was intentional and that a mere negligent intrusion into
one's private affairs does not constitute an actionable invasion of privacy.43 In
381d. at 140, 226 N.E.2d at 762.
1120 Ohio App. 3d 4, 484 N.E.2d 265 (1985).
1'1d. at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 266.
"Id. at 5, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
421d.
"4Id. at 6-7, 484 N.E.2d at 267.
"Id.
'In advocating this position, appellees Scharold and Neumann relied strongly upon McCormick v. Haley,
Winter, 19861
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so doing, the court stated:
We find puzzling the postulation in McCormick v. Haley that seems to
conclude that "negligently" and "intentionally" are mutually exclusive.
We believe that in given factual situations there could well be mixed
negligence and intention. We do not elaborate on this point, nor is it
necessary for us to do so. We also have some trouble with the statement in
McCormick v. Haley that "a mere negligent intrusion into one's private
activities does not constitute an actionable invasion of the right of
privacy." It seems to us that a negligent invasion of the right of privacy,
which is a distinct possibility in the factual scenario subjudice, can just as
effectively invade one's right of privacy as an intention to do so.,,
The court relied heavily upon the following language in Housh v. Peth,47
in which the Ohio Supreme Court used the broad language of "wrongful intru-
sion," as opposed to "intentional intrusion," in defining an actionable invasion
of privacy:
An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted ap-
propriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's
private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of or-
dinary sensibilities. 8
Holding physicians liable for negligent disclosures of confidential infor-
mation is eminently sound. While the language used by the Prince court was
sufficiently broad, as was the Housh language upon which it relied, to encom-
pass virtually any action for invasion of privacy, on close inspection the
holding may actually have little application outside of the realm of confiden-
tial, professional relationships such as that of the physician and patient. The
reason for this lies in the very nature of negligence as an actionable tort. In
order for one to be held liable for negligence, one must be found to have had a
duty of care and to have failed to meet that duty.49 In the case of a defendant
not privy to a confidential professional relationship, the legal standard should,
at the very least, be less than that applied to the professional in a confidential
relationship. Indeed, in many cases one might be found to have no duty of care
37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34 (1973), wherein the court stated that:
A mere negligent intrusion into one's private activities does not constitute an actionable invasion of
the right of privacy. Thus, if the trier of the facts were to accept, as the trial court did, the defendant's
testimony that the communications were only negligently and not intentionally sent, there could be
no right of recovery.
Id. at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
'20 Ohio App. 3d at 7, 484 N.E.2d at 268.
7 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
4 1d. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
"See PROSSER, TORTS 324-50 (4th ed. 1971).
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whatsoever, thus limiting liability to the more traditional situation of inten-
tional publication. This distinction also points out the uniqueness of
unauthorized disclosures of confidential information in a professional setting
and the need to recognize breach of confidence as a tort in its own right.
In the case of the physician-patient relationship, the duty of care required
of the physician to maintain the confidences of his patients is clear, if not from
the nature of the physician-patient relationship alone, then from the plethora
of statutes mandating confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship."
Additionally, several statutes actually imply a right of action on the part of the
patient in the event of unauthorized disclosure. For example, Section 3701.261
of the Ohio Revised Code, a statute that authorizes disclosure of information
about malignant diseases to cancer registeries, provides that no physician or
treating facility
furnishing such information ... to any such cancer registry, with respect
to a case of malignant disease treated or examined by such physician...
or hospital, shall by reason of such furnishing be deemed to have violated
any confidential relationship, or be held liable in damages to any person,
or be held to answer for betrayal of a professional secret.5
Similarly, Section 2305.24 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that no per-
son or institution providing information to a state or local medical society or
hospital utilization committee shall be held liable in damages or for betrayal of
a professional secret.52 Even more interesting, however, is that Section 2305.24
expressly states that "a right of action similar to that a patient may have
against an attending physician for misuse of information.., arising out of the
physician-patient relationship, shall accrue against a member of a utilization
committee for misuse of any such information... furnished to such committee
by an attending physician."53 Thus, these sections demonstrate the Ohio
"See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
1O1io REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.261 (Baldwin 1983). Section 3701.261 reads in full as follows:
Any information, data, and reports with respect to a malignant disease which are furnished to. or pro-
cured by, any cancer registry in this state shall be confidential and shall be used only for statistical.
scientific, and medical research for the purpose of reducing the morbidity or mortality of malignant
disease. No physician, surgeon, dentist, institution, or hospital furnishing such information, data, or
report to any such cancer registry, with respect to a case of malignant disease treated or examined by
such physician, or surgeon, dentist or confined in such institution or hospital, shall by reason of such
furnishing be deemed to have violated any confidential relationship, or be held liable in damages to
any person, or be held to answer for betrayal of a professional secret within the meaning and intent of
section 4731.22 of the Revised Code.
Id.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.24 (Baldwin 1983).
"Id. Section 2305.24 provides in full that:
Any information, data, reports, or records made available to a utilization committee of a hospital, or a
utilization committee of a state or local medical society composed of doctors of medicine or doctors of
osteopathic medicine and surgery shall be confidential and shall be used by such committee and the
committee members only in the exercise of the proper functions of such utilization committee. A right
of action similar to that a patient may have against an attending physician for misuse of information,
data, reports, or records arising out of the physician-patient relationship, shall accrue against a
member of a utilization committee for misuse of any such information, data, reports, or records fur-
nished to such committee by an attending physician. No physician, surgeon, institution, or hospital
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Legislature's concern for confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship
and its endorsement of the theory of breach of confidence first set forth in
Ohio by the Hammonds holding.S4
DUTIES AND CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGES TO RELEASE MEDICAL INFORMATION
The Ohio courts are free to endorse any or all of the legal theories relied
upon by other courts to impose civil liability for the unauthorized disclosure of
medical information. While each theory has different elements which must be
met and different potential remedies for the successful plaintiff,55 for the most
part it is likely to make little difference which theory or theories are applied
since most of the courts confronted with the problem of unauthorized disclo-
sures have relied upon a number of legal theories for imposing liability.56 Fre-
quently, while finding that such disclosures are actionable, the courts fail to
specify the exact basis for imposing liability,5" or, while specifying a theory of
liability, the courts ignore the precise elements of the theory and its limita-
tions.5" Of greater concern than the theory or theories of liability likely to be
furnishing information, data, reports, or records to any such committee with respect to any patient
examined or treated by such physician or surgeon or confined in such institution or hospital shall, by
reason of such furnishing, be deemed liable in damages to any person, or be held to answer for
betrayal of a professional secret within the meaning and intent of section 4731.22 of the Revised
Code. Information, data, or reports furnished to a utilization committee of a state or local medical
society shall contain no name of any person involved therein.
As used in this section, "utilization committee" is the committee established to administer a utiliza-
tion review plan of a hospital or extended care facility as provided in the "Health Insurance for the
Aged Act." 79 Stat. 313 (1965), 42 U.S.C. 139x(k).
Id.
Additionally, Section 2305.251 of the Revised Code provides for the confidentiality of utilization commit-
tee records as follows:
Proceedings and records of all review committees described in section 2305.25 of the Revised Code
shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any
civil action against a health care professional or institution arising out of matters which are the sub-
ject of evaluation and review by such committee. No person within attendance at a meeting of such
committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence or other mat-
ters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any finding, recommen-
dation, evaluation, opinion, or other action of such committee or member thereof. Information.
documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as being
unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they were presented during pro-
ceedings of such committee nor should any person testifying before such committee or who is any
member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to matters within his knowledge, but the
witness cannot be asked about his testimony before such committee or opinion formed by him as a
result of such committee hearing.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin 1983).
'See supra textual discussion of duties to disclose medical records accompanying notes 72-76.
"
5For a detailed analysis of the different legal theories upon which liability for release of medical information
may be based see Note, Action For Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom, 36 U. CIN. L. REV.
103 (1967).
1
6See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna, 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (relying on contract, trust, and tort);
Horne v. Patton., 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (relying on contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of
confidential relationship).
'See, e.g., Berry v. Moench. 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) (appeared to impose liability based on tort
of breach of confidence but failed to clearly identify nature of action and its elements).
'See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (contractual liability imposed on
both defendants where only one defendant had a contractual relationship with plaintiff).
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endorsed by the state courts of Ohio are the circumstances under which the
courts are likely to find that a disclosure is privileged. An obvious privilege ex-
ists where the patient or his duly authorized agent or legal guardian has con-
sented to the release or has waived his right to confidentiality. In fact, a num-
ber of cases have held that where the patient authorizes a physician or hospital
to release information, there is a legal obligation to provide that information.59
There is also existing law to the effect that the public interest may provide
a conditional privilege where the public interest outweighs the interest of the
patient in the secrecy of his communications to his physician. For example, in
Simonsen v. Swenson,' a Nebraska case decided in 1920, the court, while
recognizing that a patient generally has a right to have his confidences in his
physician maintained, excused the defendant physician's disclosure of the pa-
tient's condition as privileged. The plaintiff was a transient telephone company
employee boarding at a hotel when he consulted the defendant physician about
a condition the defendant preliminarily diagnosed as a venereal disease. The
plaintiff refused to leave the hotel at the request of the defendant, who feared
that the disease might spread. The defendant informed the hotel owner of his
concern that the plaintiff had a contagious disease and advised the owner to
disinfect his sheets, but the owner ejected the plaintiff from the hotel. Another
physician was subsequently unable to prove the disease, but confirmed that the
defendant physician had reasonable grounds for his suspicion. The court found
that the defendant exercised reasonable judgment in balancing the interest of
the public against the plaintiff's interest in his privacy.6
Several courts have raised the conditional public interest privilege to the
level of a duty. In a New York case styled Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of
America,62 for example, an employer who provided free x-rays to employees
was held liable to an employee and his family members who contracted a
disease for failing to warn them of a danger which the employer had become
aware of through those x-rays.
In a similar vein, the Ohio Legislature has weighed the public interest in
having access to records held by state institutions against the privacy interest
of patients admitted to state, county, and municipal hospitals and has deter-
mined that the public's right to know outweighs the privacy interest of the pa-
tient to the extent that the institutions are required to disclose the fact of ad-
"
9See, e.g., Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 350 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1965);
Pyramid Life Insurance Co. v. Masonic Hospital Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Okla. 1961); Murphy v. God-
win, 303 A.2d 668 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
60 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
6Id. at 225, 177 N.W.2d at 832.
6218 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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mission, discharge, birth and death upon request.63 Further, the Ohio Revised
Code places affirmative duties on physicians to report medical information
concerning occupational diseases,' contagious and infectious diseases,65 indicia
63See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1983).
OHO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3701.25, 4123.71 (Baldwin 1983). Section 3701.25 provides in relevant part:
Every physician attending on or called in to visit a patient whom he believes to be suffering from
poisoning from lead, phosphorus, arsenic, brass, wood alcohol, mercury, or their compounds, or from
anthrax or from compressed air illness and such other occupational diseases and ailments as the
department of health shall require to be reported, shall within forty-eight hours from the time of first
attending such patient send to the director of health a report stating:
(A) Name, address, and occupation of patient;
(B) Name, address, and business of employer;
(C) Nature of disease;
(D) Such other information as may be reasonably required by the department.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.25 (Baldwin 1984).
Section 4123.71 provides in relevant part:
Every physician in this state attending on or called in to visit a patient whom he believes to be suffer-
ing from an occupational disease as defined in section 4123.68 of the Revised Code shall, within forty-
eight hours from the time of making such diagnosis, send to the industrial commission a report
stating:
(A) Name, address, and occupation of patient;
(B) Name and address of business in which employed;
(C) Nature of disease;
(D) Name and address of employer of patient;
(E) Such other information as is reasonably required by the commission.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.71 (Baldwin 1984).
65OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3701.24, 3701.52, 3707.06 (Baldwin 1984). Section 3701.24 provides:
Boards of health, health authorities or officials, and physicians in localities in which there are no
health authorities or officials, shall report to the department of health promptly upon the discovery of
the disease, the existence of any one of the following diseases:
(A) Asiatic cholera;
(B) Yellow fever;
(C) Diptheria;
(D) Typhus or typhoid fever;
(E) Any other contagious or infectious diseases that the public health council specifies.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24 (Baldwin 1984).
Section 3701.52 provides:
Every physician, surgeon, obstetrician, midwife, nurse, maternity home or hospital of any nature,
parent, relative, or any others attendant on any person with inflammation of the eyes, knowing either
condition, defined in section 3701.51 of the Revised Code, to exist, within six hours thereafter, shall
report such facts, as the department of health shall direct, to the health commissioner of the city or
general health district within which such person may reside.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.52 (Baldwin 1984).
Section 3707.06 provides:
Each physician or other person called to attend a person suffering from cholera, plague, yellow fever,
typhus fever, diptheria, typhoid fever, or any other disease dangerous to the public health, or required
by the department of health to be reported, shall report to the health commissioner within whose
jurisdiction the sick person is found the name, age. sex, and color of the patient, and the house and
place in which the sick person may be found. In like manner, the owner or agent of the owner of a
building in which a person resides who has any of the listed diseases, or in which are the remains of a
person having died of any of the listed diseases, and the head of the family, immediately after becom-
ing aware of the fact, shall give notice thereof to the health commissioner.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.06 (Baldwin 1984).
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of child abuse," various vital statistics,67 and certain evidence of serious
criminal conduct to various state agencies. 8
fOIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Baldwin 1984). Section 2151.421 provides in relevant part:
Any attorney, physician, including a hospital intern or resident, dentist, podiatrist, practitioner of a
limited branch of medicine or surgery as defined in section 4731.15 of the Revised Code, registered or
licensed practical nurse, visiting nurse, or other health care professional, licensed psychologist, speech
pathologist or audiologist, coroner, administrator or employee of a child day-care center, or ad-
ministrator or employee of a certified child care agency or other public or private children services
agency, school teacher or school authority, social worker, or person rendering spiritual treatment
through prayer in accordance with the tenets of a well recognized religion, acting in his official or pro-
fessional capacity, having reason to believe that a child less than eighteen years of age or any crippled
or otherwise physically or mentally handicapped child under twenty-one years of age has suffered any
wound, injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to reasonably indicate abuse or neglect of
the child, shall immediately report or cause reports to be made of such information to the children ser-
vices board or the county department of welfare exercising the children services function, or a
municipal or county peace officer in the county in which the child resides or in which the abuse or
neglect is occurring or has occurred.
Anyone having reason to believe that a child less than eighteen years of age or any crippled or
otherwise physically or mentally handicapped child under twenty-one years of age has suffered any
wound, injury, disability, or other condition of such nature as to reasonably indicate abuse or neglect
of the child may report or cause reports to be made of such information to the children services board
or the county department of welfare exercising the children services function, or to a municipal or
county peace officer.
The reports shall be made forthwith by telephone or in person forthwith, and shall be followed by a
written report, if requested by the receiving agency or officer ....
When the attendance of the physician is pursuant to the performance of services as a member of
the staff of a hospital or similar institution, he shall notify the person in charge of the institution or his
designated delegate who shall make the necessary reports ....
Anyone or any hospital, institution, school, health department, or agency participating in the mak-
ing of the reports, or anyone participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from the reports, shall be
immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result of
such actions. Notwithstanding section 4731.22 of the Revised Code, the physician-patient privilege
shall not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries, abuse. or neglect, or the cause
thereof in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report submitted pursuant to this section.
Id.
"
7See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.14 (Baldwin 1984). Section 3705.14 provides in relevant part that
"ITihe attending physician or midwife shall file, within ten days after every birth, with the local registrar of
vital statistics of the district a certificate of birth giving all the particulars therein required .... Birth cer-
tificates shall not be invalid because of delayed filing." Id.
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (Baldwin 1984). Section 2921.22 provides in relevant part:
(A) No person, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report
such information to law enforcement authorities.
(B) No physician, limited practitioner, nurse, or person giving aid to a sick or injured person, shall
negligently fail to report to law enforcement authorities any gunshot or stab wound treated or
observed by him, any serious physical harm to persons that he knows or has reasonable cause to
believe resulted from an offense of violence, any second or third degree burn that was inflicted by
an explosion or other incendiary device, or any burn that shows evidence of having been inflicted
in a violent, malicious, or criminal manner.
(C) No person who discovers the body or acquires the first knowledge of the death of any person shall
fail to report the death immediately to any physician whom the person knows to be treating the
deceased for a condition from which death at such time would not be unexpected, or to a law en-
forcement officer, ambulance service, emergency squad, or the coroner in a political subdivision
in which the body is discovered, the death is believed to have occurred, or knowledge concerning
the death is obtained.
(D) No person shall fail to provide upon request of the person to whom he has made a report required
by division (C) of this section, or to any law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to
assert the authority to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death, any facts within his
knowledge that may have a bearing on the investigation of the death.
(E) Division (A) or (D) of this section does not require disclosure of information, when any of the
following applies:
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The interest of a specific third person may also create a privilege. In Berry
v. Moench,69 for example, the court considered the types of conditional
privileges a physician might assert to a claim of breach of confidentiality. The
court stated that the physician's duty to keep the confidences of his patients
might be outweighed where there is a sufficiently important interest to protect
in a third person." In determining when a third person's interest is sufficient to
justify an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information, the
Berry court stated:
We recognize that such a privilege may also extend to protection of the in-
terests of third persons under proper circumstances. Where life, safety,
well-being or other important interest is in jeopardy, one having informa-
tion which could protect against the hazard, may have a conditional
privilege to reveal information for such purpose, even though it be
defamatory and may prove to be false. But the privilege is not something
which arises automatically and becomes absolute merely because there is
an interest to protect. It has its origin in, and it is governed by, the rule of
good sense and customary conduct of people motivated by good will and
proper consideration for others. This includes due consideration for the
subject being informed about as well as the recipient being protected....
(T)he law imposes upon one publishing derogatory information, even for
laudatory purposes, the responsibility of exercising due care in what he
(I) The information is privileged by reason of the relationship between attorney and client, doctor
and patient, licensed psychologist or licensed school psychologist and client, priest and peni-
tent, clergyman or rabbi or minister or priest and any person communicating information
confidentially to him for a religious counseling purpose in his professional character, or hus-
band and wife.
(2) The information would tend to incriminate a member of the actor's immediate family.
(3) Disclosure of the information would amount to revealing a news source, privileged under sec-
tion 2739.04 or 2739.12 of the Revised Code.
(4) Disclosure of the information would amount to disclosure by an ordained clergyman of an
organized religious body of a confidential communication made to him in his capacity as such
by a person seeking his aid or counsel.
(5) Disclosure would amount to revealing information acquired by the actor in the course of his
duties in connection with a bona fide program of treatment or services for drug dependent
persons or persons in danger of drug dependence, which program is maintained or conducted
by a hospital, clinic, person, agency, or organization registered pursuant to section 5122.51 of
the Revised Code.
(6) Disclosure would amount to revealing information acquired by the actor in the course of his
duties in connection with a bona fide program for providing counseling services to victims of
crimes that are violations of section 2907.02, 2907.05, or 2907.12 of the Revised Code ....
(F) No disclosure of information pursuant to this section gives rise to any liability or recrimination
for a breach of privilege or confidence.
(G) Whoever violates division (A) or (B) of this section is guilty of failure to report a crime. Violation
of division (A) of this section is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. Violation of division (B) of
this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.
(H) Whoever violates division (C) or (D) of this section is guilty of failure to report knowledge of a
death, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
Id.
698 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958). This case involved a physician's advice to his patient's fiancee to "run
as far as she could in any direction away" from the patient because of the patient's record of trouble. Id. at
195, 331 P.2d at 816.
'Old. at 196, 331 P.2d at 817.
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does and in knowing whereof he speaks.7'
As is readily apparent, the privilege to disclose confidential information to
protect the interest of a third person and the privilege to protect the public safe-
ty are very similar in nature. The only distinction seems to be whether the in-
terest of one or several persons is threatened. Just as in the case of a public in-
terest, a number of courts have raised the conditional privilege of disclosure to
a third person to a duty to disclose under proper circumstances. A case in point
is Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,72 wherein the Supreme
Court of California held that a physician who is aware of a threat to a third
person owes a duty to that person to warn him of the peril in spite of the gener-
al duty of confidentiality the physician owes to his patient.73 The Tarasoff
holding has been cited by a number of other courts in other jurisdictions with
approval.74
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a physician has a
duty to protect third persons from the risk of contracting a contagious disease
by alerting both the responsible health officials and any individuals he knows
are likely to have contact with his patient. The case was styled Jones v. Stanko,
Admx., 1 and involved an action to recover damages resulting from the
wrongful death of the plaintiffs husband, alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the defendant physician. The death of a neighbor of the plaintiff
was caused by black smallpox, and the defendant was the sole attending physi-
cian seeing the patient every day until the day the patient died. The plaintiff
alleged that her husband inquired of the defendant whether the patient was
suffering from any contagious disease, and the defendant assured him that his
patient was not and that he (the plaintiffs husband) bore no risk from visiting
the patient in his illness. By reason of these assurances from the defendant, the
plaintiffs husband not only visited his neighbor, but also waited upon him
prior to his death and performed certain services with reference to his prepara-
tion for burial after death. It was admitted in the record that the defendant also
failed to notify the appropriate health authorities, as he was required by law to
do, of the fact that he was treating a patient for a contagious disease. The only
matter in dispute in the case was whether the defendant was negligent in fail-
ing to discover that his patient was suffering from the contagious disease of
black smallpox and in failing to give notice thereof to the appropriate public
health officials and to those who were coming into the presence of his patient.
In its syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court put forth the rule of law as follows:
It is the duty of a physician who is treating a patient afflicted with
"Id. at 197-98, 331 P.2d at 817-18. See RESTATEMENT (SECONDI OF TORTS § 595 (1977).
7217 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
"Id. at 435-42, 551 P.2d at 343-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 823-28.
'See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982).
11118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
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smallpox to exercise ordinary care in giving notice of the existence of such
contagious disease to other persons who are known by the physician to be
in dangerous proximity to such patient; and a failure to discharge this du-
ty will constitute negligence on the part of the physician available to any
person in the recovery of damages resulting directly and proximately from
such neglect on the part of the physician."
The Jones case is important for three reasons. First, it clearly
demonstrates that the Ohio common law rule is that a physician can have a du-
ty to third parties with whom he has no professional relationship. Second, it
places on the physician an affirmative duty to warn others not only of a danger
that he is aware of but also of a danger that he should be aware of by exercis-
ing the standard of care that he owes to his patient. Third, a physician is not
relieved of his duty to others merely by reporting the danger to the appropriate
governmental agency. His duty continues beyond any statutory obligation of
reporting to require direct notice to specific persons he knows are at risk.
Under proper circumstances, the self-interest of the attending physician or
health care facility may create a conditional privilege. For example, in the
Hammonds case the court recognized that the physician could disclose the pa-
tient's confidences where necessary to defend a malpractice suit." The current
version of the Ohio testimonial privilege statute expressly permits the physi-
cian to disclose otherwise confidential information in defending a suit against
him that relates to the treatment given to the patient."8 This issue was ad-
dressed by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in a case styled
Otto v. Miami Valley Hospital,79 wherein the court stated:
(T)he privileged communication statute has no application to an adver-
sary action between the two parties to the communication where the testi-
mony is essential either to maintain or to defend the particular action. To
deny relief or defense by denying evidence would be unconstitutional....
761d. at 147, 160 N.E. at 457.
"Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 805. (In letting others view evidence, a physician releasing information leaves
himself open to potential liability where the disclosure is not necessary to defend a claim pending against the
physician.)
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Baldwin 1984). Section 2317.02(B) provides in relevant part:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:...
(B) A physician concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation or his advice
to his patient but the physician may testify by express consent of the patient or if the patient is
deceased by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the
estate of such deceased patient or if the patient voluntarily testifies the physician may be com-
pelled to testify on the same subject, or if the patient, his executor or administrator, files a medical
claim, as defined in division (D)(3) of section 2305.11 of the Revised Code, such filing shall con-
stitute a waiver of this privilege with regard to the care and treatment of which complaint is
made. The provisions of this division apply to doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathic
medicine, and doctors of podiatric medicine.
Id. (emphasis added.)
'926 Ohio Misc. 73, 266 N.E.2d 270 (Montgomery County Ct. of C.P. 197 1).
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We agree that in an action against a physician for malpractice the doctor
may disclose communications. (Citation omitted.) And we add that when
a patient sues his doctor for malpractice, the patient must disclose in
pleading and in discovery if he wishes to proceed. 0
The Otto decision must be distinguished from the Hammonds decision.
Since the plaintiff in Hammonds had neither brought suit nor actually
threatened it against the physician (as the insurance company had represented
to the physician), the Hammonds court found that there was no privilege on
the mere possibility that the patient might bring an action." The Otto court, on
the other hand, faced a situation where the patient had actually brought suit
against the attending physician. The physician's need to disclose confidential
information in order to defend himself in a malpractice suit is widely recog-
nized and so obviously necessary that the issue has seldom been litigated. 2
In Patton v. Jacobs,3 an Indiana court held that a physician may disclose
the patient's medical bill in an effort to collect an overdue debt. This seems
logical, and is probably the law in Ohio, but it is important to note the discus-
sion below concerning the limits placed upon conditional privileges. The type
of information which a physician may release to collect a just debt should be
limited to that which is necessary to collect the debt.
In all situations where the release of the medical information is permissi-
ble, the scope of the waiver, authorization, privilege or duty must be con-
sidered. For example, the court in the Hammonds held that where a plaintiff
deposed his physician, the plaintiff waived any right to object to an opposing
party's deposition of that physician. The court also held that the waiver was
limited in scope and did not permit the physician to engage in ex parte
disclosures of information that the physician obtained during the course of
treatment.85 The same should be true with respect to the physician's duty to
disclose certain information to public health officials. 6 Such a duty would not
prevent liability for disclosing that information to individuals to whom the
physician has no legal duty to report.
In a Utah case styled Berry v. Moench, 87 the court provided the following
summary of the limitations placed on conditional privileges in the area of
defamation to guide a lower court in its determination of whether or not a
lid. at 74-75, 266 N.E.2d at 272.
"Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 804-05.
"2See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 1458 (1966).
11118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948),
1'Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 805.
851d.
"See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.05 (Baldwin 1984). (Physician must report occupational disease to
the Ohio Department of Health.)
118 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
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physician should be liable for providing confidential information about a pa-
tient to that patient's fiancee:
(A)n examination of the authorities reveals that quite generally, when the
matter is actually in issue, they are in accord upon a principle which we
consider sound and salutary: that the privilege to pass on derogatory in-
formation, which proves false, must have been exercised with at least rea-
sonable discretion, or the publisher will be held responsible therefor. This
is well summarized in [Section 595 of] the Restatement of Torts: "Even
though an occasion is so privileged, a particular person cannot avail
himself of the privilege arising therefrom if he abuses the occasion ....
The occasion may be abused by the publisher's lack of belief or reasonable
grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory matter... ; by publica-
tion of the defamatory matter for some improper purpose ... ; by ex-
cessive publication ... ; or by the publication of defamatory matter not
reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose." [A
privilege] must be exercised with certain cautions: (a) it must be done in
good faith and reasonable care must be exercised as to its truth, (b)
likewise, the information must be reported fairly, (c) only such informa-
tion should be conveyed, and (d) only to such persons as are necessary to
the purpose."
While the Berry court summarized limitations on conditional privileges in
the area of defamation, it is likely that any court dealing with the unauthorized
release of patient information by a physician will look to this area of law in de-
ciding whether or not a particular communication should be held privileged.
The court in Hammonds appears to have taken this approach in deciding
whether or not there was a privilege as to the communication at issue in that
case.
89
SUMMARY
The case law from Ohio and other states indicates that the unauthorized
disclosure of medical information by anyone in a confidential relationship with
the patient to whom the information relates is an actionable tort. The precise
nature of the tort and its contours are still emerging as the case law on the sub-
ject develops. While the courts that have dealt with unauthorized disclosures
of medical information have relied upon a number of legal theories to impose
liability on the practitioner making such a disclosure, it is clear that the courts
have, in fact, given little consideration to the actual elements and defenses to
the various established legal theories and have freely bent the limits of such
theories or glossed over their elements to reach the ultimate result of finding
"ld. at 198-99, 331 P.2d at 818-19 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977)).
sHammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 803-05.
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unauthorized and unjustified disclosures of medical information actionable.
The following elements generally have been present in cases where liability has
been imposed for release of medical information:
1. There has been a disclosure of medical information to a third party;
2. The publisher obtained the information during the course of a profes-
sional relationship with the patient or from someone else who obtained
the information in the course of a professional relationship with the pa-
tient;
3. The professional relationship was of such a nature as to cause the pa-
tient to have a reasonable expectation that the information would be
held in confidence; and
4. The publisher communicated the information, either intentionally or
negligently, to a third party without reasonable justification, or while
justification was present, the publisher exceeded the limits of the
justification by publishing more information than was necessary or by
providing the information to more people than was necessary to ac-
complish the purpose of the justification.
In addition to finding various conditional privileges to disclose otherwise
confidential communications, such as when a physician seeks to collect a just
debt or defend against a suit brought against the physician by the subject of the
information, the courts in limited circumstances also have imposed a duty
upon the physician and others holding medical information to disclose the in-
formation to a third party where there is a risk of substantial harm to the third
party. In such cases, the duty to disclose arises only where the holder of the
medical information either is or should be aware of the potential harm and has
an opportunity to convey the information to the individual or group at risk or
to an appropriate public official who is responsible for the well-being of such
individual or group. In deciding whether or not to make such a communication
to protect the interests of another individual or group, one must engage in a
delicate balancing process of weighing the privacy interest of the patient
against the risk of harm to others, bearing in mind the gravity of the decision
and the potential for personal liability.
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